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The Hague Evidence Convention in the
Aftermath of Sociiti Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale
By PASCAL W. Di FRONZO
Member of the Class of 1989
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 19, 1980, a plane designed and manufactured in France
and marketed in the United States by Socite Nationale Industrielle A4er-
ospatiale and Societe De Construction DAvions De Tourism I (Petitioners)
crashed in Iowa, injuring the pilot and a passenger. As a result of this
accident, Dennis Jones, John George, and Rosa George (Respondents)
instituted separate actions for damages against Petitioners in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
Petitioners answered the complaints without questioning the juris-
diction of the District Court. The cases were consolidated and referred
to a magistrate with the parties' consent. Initial discovery was conducted
by both sides pursuant to the United States Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.2 Again, Petitioners voiced no objections. However, when Respon-
dents served a second request for the production of documents pursuant
to Rule 34,3 a set of interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33,4 and requests
for admission pursuant to Rule 36,1 Petitioners filed a Motion for Protec-
tive Order pursuant to Rule 26(c).6
The Petitioners argued that because they are French corporations
and the discovery sought could be found only in France, a foreign state,
the Hague Evidence Convention7 exclusively dictated the pre-trial dis-
1. Both are French corporations and are wholly owned by the French government. So-
cit Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. -, 107 S.
Ct. 2542 (1987) [hereinafter Aerospatiale].
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
3. Id. Rule 34.
4. Id. Rule 33.
5. Id. Rule 36.
6. Id. Rule 26(c).
7. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Mat-
ters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231
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covery procedures that Respondents must follow. Petitioners' further as-
serted that under French penal law8 they could not respond to discovery
requests that did not comply with the Evidence Convention. Therefore,
Petitioners' motion raised the highly controversial issue of whether the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Hague Evidence Convention has
precedence in obtaining evidence abroad for use in American courts.
The Magistrate denied Petitioners' motion insofar as it related to
answering interrogatories, producing documents, and making admis-
sions, but granted it in regard to oral depositions to be taken in France.9
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit."0 Although immediate appellate review of an interlocu-
tory discovery order is usually not available, the Court of Appeals rec-
ommended such review because of the novelty and importance of the
question presented, and the likelihood of its recurrence." The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately decided the case
in June 1987.12
This Note discusses the Supreme Court's decision and the Hague
Evidence Convention's applicability in the United States. First, the Evi-
dence Convention's negotiation history and the American desire for
greater international judicial cooperation are discussed. Second, the dif-
fering American interpretations of the Evidence Convention's applica-
tion in United States courts are addressed, culminating in the Supreme
Court decision in Ae'rospatiale.13 Third, the views of other contracting
states are considered with respect to future prospects for the Evidence
Convention's use and international judicial cooperation. Last, recom-
mendations concerning the use of the Evidence Convention by American
parties seeking evidence abroad from foreign nationals are made in the
interest of promoting greater international judicial cooperation.
II. HISTORY OF THE HAGUE EVIDENCE
CONVENTION
Prior to the ratification of the Hague Service Convention14 and the
(entered into force between the United States and France on Oct. 7, 1972) [hereinafter Hague
Evidence Convention].
8. See blocking statute infra note 84.
9. App. to Pet. for Cert. at 25a, reprinted in Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2547.
10. In re Soci&6t Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986), ap-
pealed sub nom. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
11. 782 F.2d at 123.
12. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542.
13. Id.
14. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents In
[Vol. 12
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Hague Evidence Convention, United States law had developed in relative
isolation from international procedural law. 5 As a result, in 1958, the
United States Congress established the Commission and Advisory Com-
mittee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, which led to United
States membership in the Hague Conference on Private International
Law16, and culminated in American participation in the Hague Service
and the Hague Evidence Conventions. 17
The Hague Service Convention, which the United States Senate rati-
fied in 1967,"8 provides contracting states with mandatory procedures for
serving judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial mat-
ters.19 The successful application of the Hague Service Convention,
along with the longstanding interest of American lawyers in improving
procedures for obtaining evidence abroad, motivated the United States to
propose a convention on international discovery procedures.20
Great differences between civil law and common law discovery pro-
cedures created the need for uniform procedures for taking evidence
abroad. Civil law countries do not share the common law concept of pre-
trial discovery as a separate episode which takes place isolated from the
trial itself.2 In civil law systems, "evidence is taken only when directed
by the court, and witnesses are interrogated by the judge, not by coun-
Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T..A.S No.
6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention]. The Hague Service Conven-
tion established mandatory procedures for the service of process in signatory countries. 107 S.
CL at 2550-51 n.15.
15. See Heck, U.S. Misinterpretation of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 COLUm. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 231, 278 (1986).
16. The Hague Conference on Private International Law, an association of sovereign
states, conducts periodic sessions in order to "work for the progressive unification of the rules
of private international law." Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
opened for signature Oct. 31, 1951, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. 2228, T.I.A.S. No. 5710, 220 U.N.T.S.
121. The United States participated in the 1956 and 1960 sessions as an observer and in 1964
officially became a member pursuant to congressional authorization. See S. ExEC. Doc. A,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. v (1963); Pub. L. 88-244, 77 Stat. 775 (1963).
17. See Note, Gathering Evidence Abroad The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited, 16
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 963 (1984); see also Pfund, United States Participation in Interna-
tional Unification of Private Law, 19 INT'L LAW. 505 (1985) (a detailed account of these
developments).
18. Hague Service Convention, supra note 14.
19. See id. (for procedures and language); see also Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2550
(1987) (interpreting Hague Service Convention as mandatory language).
20. See Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad, (Statement of Carl F. Salans, Deputy
Legal Adviser, Department of State) S. ExEc. REP. No. 25, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972)
[hereinafter Evidence Abroad].
21. See Jones, International Judicial Assistance" Procedural Chaos and a Program for Re-
form, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 527-28 (1953).
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sel. ' 22 Additionally, in civil law trials, there is often no verbatim tran-
script available, as civil law judges will simply dictate a summary of the
testimony as the official record of the proceedings.23
Significant procedural differences exist not only between the United
States and civil law jurisdictions, but also between the United States and
other common law jurisdictions, particularly the United Kingdom. In
general, in the United Kingdom much discovery is unavailable that is
readily available in the United States, and the courts control the discov-
ery process much more than their American counterparts.24 Often other
common law jurisdictions share more in common with the civil law dis-
covery practices than with American discovery practices.
In contrast to United States practice, which looks favorably upon
long-arm jurisdiction, foreign states, both civil and common law, tend to
avoid long-arm jurisdiction over non-residents, at least when they are not
nationals. Furthermore, unlike the United States, these countries do not
consider the foreign subsidiary of a domestic parent corporation to be a
national.25
When civil and other common law countries do seek evidence
abroad, they usually do so only with the cooperation and acquiescence of
the courts and law enforcement officials in the foreign state where the
information is located.26 Conversely, the majority of American courts
order the production of information located abroad, frequently ignoring
the courts and law enforcement officials in foreign states.27 In addition,
when other countries (both civil & common law) seek foreign informa-
22. Id. at 527. For example, in West Germany before taking evidence the judge must be
convinced by the parties of the relevance and materiality of the evidence. Id. at 531; see also
Shemanski, Obtaining Evidence in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Impact of the Hague
Evidence Convention on German-American Judicial Cooperation, 17 INT'L LAW. 465, 467
(1983).
23. Jones, supra note 21, at 531; Shemanski, supra note 22, at 466-67.
24. See generally J. LEVINE, DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND
AMERICAN CIVIL DISCOVERY LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS (1982). In general, physical
and mental examinations and discovery of non-parties are very limited in the United King-
dom. Oral depositions are not permitted because interrogatories are more efficient and provide
the same information. There also exists a requirement of greater specificity. Requests for
inspection of property and requests for interrogatories require a court order in England. There
is greater protection of privacy and trade secrets, greater protection from harassment, and
documents must be for specific use in trial in order to be discovered, Id.
25. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, Two Cheers for the ALl Restatement's Provisions on For-
eign Discovery, 16 INT'L L. & POL. 1075, 1077 (1984).
26. See Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Administration of Justice in Connection with
the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Mar. 23, 1976, United States-Japan, 27 U.S.T. 946,
T.I.A.S. No. 8233.
27. Id.
(Vol, 12
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tion, they tend to request specific documents or provide detailed interrog-
atories; United States procedure is much more general and is done
without leave of court.2" Since these other countries generally take only
evidence that is absolutely essential to the disposition of a case, American
attempts to obtain discovery are often perceived as an encroachment
upon their legal sovereignty.29 Many foreign legal experts believe the
expansive breadth of American discovery procedures encourage wasteful
and intrusive "fishing expeditions."3
The substantial local procedural differences between the United
States and its trading partners were exacerbated by disagreement over
procedures used to obtain evidence located abroad; civil law countries
insisted upon using commissions rogatoires while the United States pre-
ferred using consuls.31 As transnational litigation became more frequent
in United States courts, the American desire for greater availability of
evidence located abroad increased dramatically.3 2 Simultaneously, other
countries' desire to protect their judicial sovereignty from what was con-
ceived to be United States "minimal contacts" jurisdiction intensified.33
Therefore, the necessity for internationally recognized discovery proce-
dures became evident and the United States became the main proponent
of the Hague Evidence Convention.34
Ill. THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
The Hague Evidence Convention provides a uniform system for the
transmission, processing, and execution of judicial requests for the taking
of evidence in foreign jurisdictions in civil or commercial matters. 35 The
28. See generally 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD § 15.10 (2d ed. 1981). Also, foreign countries will often refuse to honor United
States litigants' wide-ranging discovery demands for information in their own countries. For
example, Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention allows contracting states to refuse to
grant United States style discovery of documents. Sixteen of the twenty contracting states to
the Hague Evidence Convention have invoked Article 23. See 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW
DIREcToRy, pt. 7, 16-23 (1988) [hereinafter MARTINDALE-HUBBELL].
29. See Heck, supra note 15, at 231.
30. See Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618, 649 (Lord Goddard
CJ.), quoted with approval in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 All
E.R. 434, 455.
31. 118 CONG. REc. 20,623 (1972). Commissions rogatoires are commissions from the
presiding judge in a civil proceeding to a foreign judge requesting him to examine a witness.
Use of consuls refers to a commission from the presiding judge to a consular official located in
the foreign country where the evidence is being sought. Id.
32. See Evidence Abroad (Statement of Carl F. Salans), supra note 20, at 4.
33. See Note, supra note 17, at 974.
34. See Evidence Abroad (Statement of Carl F. Salans), supra note 20.
35. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7, intro.
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Evidence Convention is now in force in most major Western nations 6 . It
was ratified unanimously by the United States Senate in 1972,17 and fur-
nishes a principal means for obtaining evidence abroad for use in civil
proceedings in the United States.
By ratifying the Evidence Convention, a contracting state pledges to
execute requests made by a foreign court expeditiously, and to honor
those requests unless they are inconsistent with the internal law or public
policies of the requested country.38 Therefore, the Evidence Convention
replaces non-binding principles of comity39 with international treaty
obligations.' °
In its first two Chapters, the Evidence Convention provides three
alternative methods of obtaining evidence abroad.41 A litigant may re-
quest the court in which the case is pending to transmit a "Letter of
Request" to the "Central Authority"4 2 of the country where the evidence
is located (Ch. 1)." A litigant may request a "diplomatic officer or con-
sular agent" of the country where the action is pending to take evidence
in the foreign country to which he is accredited (Ch. 2).44 A litigant may
also request that a "specially appointed commissioner" take evidence in
the foreign country (Ch. 2)."
The essence of the Evidence Convention is the Letter of Request
procedure46 because it is the only method that requires the requested
36. The Hague Evidence Convention is in force in twenty countries at this time: Argen-
tina, Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. See MALTINDALE-HUBI-ELL, supra
note 28, at 16.
37. 118 CONG. REC. 20,623 (1972).
38. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7, art. 9.
39. Comity in this Note refers to the "comity of nations." It i; the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the judicial, legislative or executive acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of those who
are under the protection of its laws. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 242 (5th ed. 1979).
40. See 1 U.S. DEP'T JUST., CIVIL DIVISION PRACTICE MANUAL, INTERNATIONAL JU-
DICIAL ASSISTANCE 25 (1976) [hereinafter PRACTICE MANUAL] (cited in Heck, supra note 15,
at 233).
41. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7, arts. 1, 15, 17.
42. Id. art. 2 ("Contracting State[s] shall designate a Central Authority which will under-
take to receive Letters of Request coming from a judicial authority of another Contracting
State and to transmit them to the authority competent to execute them.").
43. See id. art. 1.
44. Id. art. 15.
45. Id. art. 17. The three methods are similar to those in FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
46. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7, intro. The introduction states: "ft]he
States signatory to the present Convention, [d]esiring to facilitate the transmission and execu-
tion of Letters of Request. . .." The judicial authority of one contracting state requests the
competent authority of another contracting state for judicial assistance by means of Letters of
[Vol. 12
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state to employ compulsory process.47 Articles 9 and 12 set forth the
compulsory nature of the Letter of Request by defining the rare instances
in which a properly made request may be refused.
Article 9 obligates a contracting state to execute a request for a
"special method or procedure" (a method not available in local proceed-
ings"r) unless it is incompatible with the internal law of the state or is
impossible to perform because of practical difficulties.49 Article 12 pro-
vides that a Letter of Request may be refused only if its execution "does
not fall within the functions of the [requested State's] judiciary;" or if the
requested State considers that "its sovereignty or security would be
prejudiced thereby."50 "Execution of a [Letter of Request] may not be
refused on the ground that under its internal law the state of execution
claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action or that
its internal law would not admit a right of action on it."5
The very limited nature of the exceptions in Articles 9 and 12 is
confirmed by the fact that in no reported case has another contracting
state invoked either Article against a Letter of Request issued by a
United States court.5 2 Considering the fundamental discovery differ-
ences between the United States and other countries, the Evidence Con-
vention's provision for compulsory execution and enforcement of
discovery requests53 represent an historic achievement in international
judicial cooperation.
The primary weakness of the Evidence Convention has been its
treatment of pre-trial discovery of documents. Article 23 of the Evidence
Convention, proposed by the United Kingdom in an attempt to limit pre-
Request. Each contracting state must establish a central authority for the acceptance of the
Letters of Request. Upon receipt of a Letter of Request, the central authority shall transmit it
to the judicial authority competent to execute it in that state. Id. arts. 1, 2.
47. See id. art. 10. Compulsory process refers to the fact that a Letter of Request must be
executed by the requested contracting state, except under very limited circumstances. Techni-
cally, compulsory process may also be requested in Chapter II proceedings. Id. art. 18. How-
ever, many contracting states have substantially restricted, if not completely excluded, the use
of Chapter H proceedings, pursuant to Article 33(1). See MARTINDALE-HuBBELU, supra note
28, at 17-18 (declarations and reservations made by France and Germany). See also Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6-10, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Joseph
Falzon, appeal dismissed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3609 (Feb. 21, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 412,415-17
(1984); PRACTICE MANuAi, supra note 40, at 233; Shemanski, supra note 22, at 475-80.
48. See Amram, United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evi-
dence Abroad, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 106 (1973).
49. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7, art. 9.
50. Id. art. 12.
51. Id.
52. See Heck, supra note 15, at 237.
53. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7, art. 10.
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trial discovery of documents,54 allows a contracting state to "declare that
it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining
pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law coun-
tries." 5 All contracting states except Barbados, Czechoslovakia, Israel
and the United States have made a declaration invoking Article 2356
However, the United Kingdom and a growing number of other con-
tracting states have subsequently modified their Article 23 declarations
and now permit the production of documents that are specified in the
Letters of Request with a "distinctiveness that would be sufficient for a
subpoena duces tecum" in the United States.57 Therefore, in the major-
ity of contracting states, discovery of documents can now be accom-
plished by using the Letter of Request procedure provided that the
request is quite specific.
IV. THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION AS UNITED
STATES LAW PRIOR TO AEROSPATIALE
The purpose of the Evidence Convention was to establish a system
for obtaining evidence located abroad that would be "tolerable" to the
state executing the request and would produce evidence "utilizable" in
the requesting state.58 The Evidence Convention, because of its broadly-
based membership, should play a prominent role :in the furtherance of
international cooperation in transnational discovery. This should be true
54. Sixteen of the twenty contracting states to the Hague Evidence Convention have exe-
cuted declarations under Article 23. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, upra note 28, at 16-23.
55. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7, art. 23. The words "pre-trial discovery of
documents as known in Common Law countries" refer to a procedure by which one of the
parties to an action may obtain access, before trial, to documents in the possession of his
adversary, to aid him in the preparation of his pleadings or in preparation for trial. The proce-
dure varies widely among states, even among common law jurisdictions. See generally
AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT, S. EXEC. REP. No. 95, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972) (here-
inafter EXPLANATORY REPORT]. A contracting state may withdraw or modify a declaration
under Article 23 at any time. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7, art. 34.
56. See MARTINDALE-HuBBELL, supra note 28, at 16-23.
57. See Heck, supra note 15, at 237. Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Singapore and Sweden have modified their Article 23 declarations in a similar fashion to
the United Kingdom. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 28, at 16-23. France has re-
cently modified its Article 23 declaration and will now honor document requests which are
"enumerated limitatively in the Letter of Request and have a precise link with the object of the
litigation." Id at 17. The Federal Republic of Germany is currently considering the modifica-
tion of its Article 23 declaration in a manner similar to the United Kingdom. See Heck, supra
note 15, at 237 n.33.
58. See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 55; Amram, supra note 48; see also, Report
of United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference on Private International
Law (Apr. 1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 785 (1969); President's Letter of Transmittal to Senate,
SEN. EXEC. Doc. A III, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972).
[Vol. 12
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especially for the United States because the Evidence Convention's ulti-
mate effect is to require contracting states to execute American-style dis-
covery requests that would not have been possible in the past under the
domestic laws of the other contracting states.5 9
However, instead of reducing conflict, the various American inter-
pretations of the Evidence Convention, evidenced by amicus briefs of the
United States government and conflicting court rulings,"° have created
great uncertainty regarding the mandates of the treaty and international
law.61 In fact, few issues of transnational law have created more contro-
versy than American attempts to obtain evidence abroad."2 Three cases
decided before Ae4rospatiale, Volkswagenwerk A..G. v. Joseph Falzon,6 3
59. See Amram, supra note 48, at 106. The Hague Evidence Convention has much less
impact with respect to requests for judicial assistance by foreign courts for two reasons. First,
domestic laws of other contracting states do not provide for discovery procedures of the kind
used in the United States; thus, requests from foreign courts will be less frequent and less
sweeping. Second, the United States already offers foreign courts judicial assistance on more
liberal terms than the Hague Evidence Convention established. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1782 (West
Supp. 1988). The Hague Evidence Convention permits the contracting states to maintain, or
introduce in the future, procedures that are more liberal than those provided in the Hague
Evidence Convention. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7, art. 27.
60. Castillo, The Hague Evidence Convention: Foreign Parties Must Provide Broad Discov-
ery in United States Litigation, 12 INT'L LEGAL PRAC. 70,74 (1987), (citing Ristau, Obtaining
Evidence Abroad Under the Hague Convention (Mar. 1985)) reprinted in AMERICAN BAR As-
SOCIATION, CoNDUCTING DISCOVERY ABROAD (July 19, 1985). Mr. Bruno Ristau, an exper-
ienced Hague Evidence Convention analyst who served on the Advisory Board of the United
States Delegation to the-Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference, commented that American
court decisions dealing with the Hague Evidence Convention's effect on the domestic law of
the United States are "in disarray." Castillo, supra, at 74. He laid partial blame on the contra-
dictory positions by the United States Solicitor General to the Supreme Court in the Falzon
and Dorin cases. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. In the first case the Solicitor
General argued that the Michigan state court orders requiring discovery outside the Conven-
tion procedure were invalid; in the second case, he argued that the Convention should not be
read as "absolutely restricting" the power of U.S. courts to employ traditional discovery de-
vices specified in federal and state rules. Castillo, supra, at 74.
61. The term "international law," as used in this article, is synonymous with the term
"law of nations." See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1894); see also The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-84 (2d Cir. 1980).
62. Recent examples include the British government's order under its blocking statute
barring British Airlines from producing documents in the Laker antitrust case, see Amicus
Curiae Appointed to Advise Court in Laker Litigation 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
902 (Dec. 1, 1983), and the intervention of Swiss authorities against production of documents
subpoenaed from Marc Rich A.G., Switzerland. See, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1983, at D2, col. I.
Although not a Hague Evidence Convention case, Marc Rich illustrates the dilemma Ameri-
can courts face when they have to operate without the aid of a treaty. Despite substantial
penalties Marc Rich A.G. never yielded to American court orders for production of docu-
ments located in Switzerland. See Marc Rich Says Fines in U.S Will Not Hurt It, Int'l Herald
Tribune, Oct. 13, 1984, at 13, col. 2.
63. 464 U.S. 811 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984).
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Club Mediterranee S.A. v. Dorin, 4 and In Re Anschuetz & Co., Gmb.,65
exemplify the confusion both in United States courts and in the United
States Solicitor General's office.
In Falzon," the Michigan trial court ordered the taking of deposi-
tions of Volkswagen employees residing in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, pursuant to Michigan civil procedure rules. The United States
Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General for the United States to file
an amicus brief expressing the views of the United States. The Solicitor
General took the position that the Hague Evidence Convention "must be
interpreted to preclude an evidence taking proceeding in the territory of a
foreign state party if the Convention does not authorize it and the host
country does not otherwise permit it." '67 In other words, the Solicitor
General advocated that the Evidence Convention procedures must be
used unless the foreign jurisdiction permits another discovery method.
Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." A
number of American courts have mirrored this first Solicitor General
position and have held that discovery of evidence in countries which are
parties to the Evidence Convention should be accomplished using Evi-
dence Convention procedures, at least as a first resort. 9
In Dorin,70 the French corporate defendant appealed a New York
State court order to answer plaintiff's interrogatories pursuant to New
York state rules of civil procedure. The defendant maintained that the
Evidence Convention had to be followed because the information and
corporate officers needed to answer the interrogatories were located in
France. Again the Supreme Court requested an amicus brief from the
United States Solicitor General. The Solicitor General altered the posi-
64. 465 U.S. 1019 (1984), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 913 (1984).
65. 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985).
66. 417 Mich. 889 (1982), cert. granted, 464 U.S. 811 (1983), appeal dismissed, 464 U.S.
1014 (1984).
67. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Joseph Falzon, appeal dismissed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1984), reprinted in 23
I.L.M. 412, 415 (1984).
68. 465 U.S. 1014.
69. See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 51 (D.
D.C. 1984); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 61 (E.D, Pa.
1983); Gebr. Eickhoff Masehinenfabrik und Eisengieberei mbH. v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492,
504-06 (W. Va. S. Ct. 1985); Vincent v. Ateliers de ]a Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716,
723, 475 A.2d 686 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); Th. Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676
S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal.
App.3d 238, 244-47, 86 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1982); Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Superior
Court, 123 Cal. App.3d 840, 857-59, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Ct. App. 1981).
70. Club Mediterranee S.A. v. Dorn, 93 A.D.2d 1007, aff'd, 462, N.Y.S.2d 524, 465 U.S.
1019 (1984), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 913 (1984).
[Vol. 12
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tion taken in the Falzon brief by asserting that American courts had
every right to order discovery in a foreign country.71 He aigued that the
Evidence Convention should not be read as "absolutely restricting" the
power of American courts to employ traditional discovery devices sped-
fled in federal and state rules.72 The Solicitor General then attempted to
distinguish Falzon by pointing out that the Federal Republic of Germany
limited its consent to discovery means prescribed by the Evidence Con-
vention, while France did not.73 Thus, only discovery orders which con-
formed to the Evidence Convention could be allowed in Falzon.
In In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH74 the United States amicus brief
stated that ordering depositions in the Federal Republic of Germany of
employees of a defendant over whom the court had personal jurisdiction
violated international law and German judicial sovereignty.75 Regarding
the production of documents and interrogatories, the amicus brief stated
that the Evidence Convention's application would be a matter of comity
if the other contracting state either has a blocking statute76 (e.g., France)
or specifically raises an objection (e.g., Germany in Anschuetz). How-
ever, the District Court rejected this argument holding that since the
court had in personam jurisdiction over the defendant it could order dep-
ositions using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
These cases and amici briefs evidenced a continuing uncertainty
over the status of the Evidence Convention within the legal order of the
United States. This uncertainty, along with the growing belief that the
Evidence Convention was inapplicable when an American court had in
personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, ultimately compelled the
Supreme Court to rule on the applicability of the Hague Evidence Con-
vention in American courts.
V. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN
AEROSPA TIALE 78
In Ae'rospatiale the Supreme Court was faced with deciding the sta-
tus and the proper application of the Hague Evidence Convention in
71. Anicus Curiae brief in Club Mediterran&, S.A. v Dorin, reprinted in 23 LLM. 1332,
1338 n.10 (1985).
72. Id. at 1338.
73. Id. at 1338 n.10.
74. 754 F.2d 602 (1985).
75. See amicus brief, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 803, 807 (1986).
76. A blocking statute is traditionally defined as a law which blocks the gathering of evi-
dence for foreign proceedings.
77. 754 F.2d at 615.
78. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
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American courts. 79 To aid it in its decision, the Court solicited amici
briefs from the United States, France, United Kingdom, Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and Switzerland. 0
In June 1987 the Supreme Court concluded that the Hague Evi-
dence Convention is United States law, but does not provide exclusive
and mandatory procedures for obtaining documents and information lo-
cated within a foreign signatory.81 The Court found that the Evidence
Convention intended to establish "optional" procedures that would facil-
itate the taking of evidence abroad. 2 The Court added that the Evidence
Convention draws no distinction between evidence in contracting states
in the possession of litigants or non-litigants.83 The Court emphasized
that a foreign nation's blocking statute does not deprive an American
court of the power to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce
evidence; nor do foreign blocking statutes require United States courts to
engraft a rule of first resort onto the Hague Evidence Convention.84
Therefore, the Evidence Convention does not deprive American courts of
the jurisdiction they otherwise possess to order a foreign national party
before them to produce evidence physically located within a contracting
state.8 5
Despite much language in the decision contrary to first resort use of
the Evidence Convention, the Court majority recognized, to a limited
extent, the importance of the Evidence Convention in promoting interna-
tional judicial cooperation. The Court stated that American courts
should exercise special vigilance in supervising pre-trial proceedings in-
volving foreign nationals, to protect foreign litigants from unnecessary or
unduly burdensome discovery that may place them in a disadvantageous
position. 6 The Court added that judicial supervision of discovery should
always seek to minimize cost and inconvenience, and that improper uses
79. Id.
80. Amici briefs, reprinted in 25 LL.M. 1475-1568 (1986).
81. 107 S. Ct. at 2548-53.
82. Id.
83. Id at 2554.
84. Id. at 2556 n.29. Although the term blocking statute is used to refer to French Penal
Code Law No. 80-538, this term is a misnomer. A blocking statute i; traditionally defined as a
law which blocks the gathering of evidence for foreign proceedings. France's statute does not
block the gathering of evidence, but merely channels such activities through the Hague Evi-
dence Convention and other judicial assistance treaties to which France is a party, See CODE
PEN. 80-538 (Fr.) English version with commentary, reprinted in Herzog, Current Develop-
ments: The 1980 French Law on Documents and Information, 75 Am. J. INT'L. L, 382 (1981).
Other contracting states to the Hague Evidence Convention have taken similar positions, See
generally Great Britain: Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. I 1 §§ 1-4.
85. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2553.
86. Id. at 2557.
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of discovery must be prevented. 7 The Supreme Court stressed that
American courts should not refuse to use Evidence Convention proce-
dures solely out of concern that they might ultimately find it necessary to
order production of evidence which a foreign tribunal previously permit-
ted a party to withhold." Although the Court did not offer guidelines to
determine when a foreign party's and a foreign nation's interests are be-
ing unjustly compromised, it did stress that objections to "abusive" dis-
covery made by a foreign litigant should receive the most careful
consideration. 9
VI. ANALYSIS OF AEROSPATIALE
A. Inadequacy of the Majority Opinion
The five to four Supreme Court decision in Ae'rospatiale resolved a
number of uncertainties that existed regarding the Hague Evidence Con-
vention's status as United States law. However, the majority conclusion
that the application of Evidence Convention procedures is "optional" is
at odds with the Evidence Convention's language and negotiation his-
tory. The Court's case-by-case comity inquiry for determining whether
to use Evidence Convention procedures and the Court's failure to pro-
vide any meaningful guidance for carrying out that inquiry will probably
lead to limited invocation and inconsistencies in the Evidence Conven-
tion's use in the United States.90
B. Negotiation History
The majority opinion ignores the historical grounds which moti-
vated the United States to be the primary advocate of the Hague Evi-
dence Convention. 91 Prior to the Evidence Convention, American courts
had to rely on the Federal Rules and vague principles of international
comity. Due to the great differences in foreign laws and practices, this
process was cumbersome and often produced unsatisfactory results. 92
"The willingness of the [Hague] Conference to proceed promptly with
87. Id. at 2557.
88. Id. at 2554-55.
89. Id. at 2557.
90. Id. at 2558 (Blackmun, ., dissenting).
91. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
92. See Augustine, Obtaining International Judicial Assistance Under the Federal Rules
and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters:
An Exposition of the Procedures and a Practical Example: In re Westinghouse Uranium Con-
tract Litigation, 10 GA. . INT'L & COMP. L. 101, 107-20 (1980); PRACTICE MANUAL, Supra
note 40, at 233. For an example, see infra note 118.
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work on the evidence convention is perhaps attributable in large measure
to the difficulties encountered by courts and lawyers in obtaining evi-
dence abroad from countries with markedly different legal systems." 9
3
Given the unsatisfactory nature of transnational discovery before
the negotiation of the Evidence Convention, it is incomprehensible that
the nations involved would agree on procedures that could be completely
ignored by a contracting state requesting evidence from another con-
tracting state. However, this is exactly what the majority concluded by
stating that the Evidence Convention procedures are "optional." 94
C. Permissive v. Mandatory Language
The majority bases its holding on what it interprets as "permissive
rather than mandatory"95 language in the Evidence Convention. While
the Court correctly asserts that Articles 1, 15, 16, and 17 of the Evidence
Convention use the word "may" in describing procedures to take evi-
dence using Letters of Request, Diplomatic Officers, Consular Agents
and Commissioners, and that the Hague Service Convention uses the
mandatory term "shall,"9 7 it incorrectly assumes that use of the word
"may" signifies the optional nature of the Evidence Convention. A care-
ful comparison of the Service and Evidence Conventions demonstrates
that the majority conclusion is mistaken.
The Evidence Convention provides three different methods by
which evidence may be taken abroad.9 8 The Service Convention does not
provide this choice, hence its Article 1 uses mandatory language.99
Moreover, Article 27 of the Evidence Convention provides that a con-
tracting state may permit, by internal law or practice, less restrictive
methods of taking evidence other than those provided for in the Evidence
Convention."° Thus, the potential for more flexible discovery proce-
dures created by Article 27 provides another reason for the use of the
word "may" in the Evidence Convention.
The majority interpreted Article 27 as proving that Evidence Con-
93. Secretary of State's Letter of Submittal Accompanying Mesage from the President of
the United States Transmitting to the Senate the Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Feb. 1, 1972), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 323, 324 (1973)
[hereinafter Letter].
94. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2550.
95. Id. at 2551.
96. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7, arts. 1, 15-17.
97. 107 S. Ct. at 2551.
98. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
99. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 14, art. 1.
100. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7, art. 27.
[Vol. 12
9 Hague Evidence Convention
vention procedures were optional.101 This is incorrect. "It is precisely
because the [Evidence] Convention does create binding international ob-
ligations among the Contracting States that Article 27 needed to be in-
corporated into the Convention.... What the Convention does is to
provide a set of minimum standards with which the Contracting States
agree to comply."' 2 Further, Articles 27, 28, and 32 of the Hague Evi-
dence Convention provide for a flexible framework for future liberaliza-
tion of procedures in any country with respect to international judicial
cooperation. 03 Thus, the Evidence Convention was intended to create
minimum mandatory discovery procedures while creating the possibility
for future liberalization of those procedures.
D. Article 23
The majority, in an attempt to buttress its conclusion that the Evi-
dence Convention is optional, points to Article 23 which expressly autho-
rizes a contracting state to "declare that it will not execute Letters of
Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of docu-
ments as known in Common Law countries."'" The majority contend
that, "it would have been most anomalous for the common law con-
tracting Parties to agree to Article 23."'10 The majority further states
that it is unable to accept "that the common law contracting States ab-
jured recourse to all pre-existing discovery procedures."'"m
The majority is mistaken on two counts with regard to Article 23.
First, Article 23 does not preclude recourse to all pre-trial discovery.'07
The Article plainly limits itself to the pre-trial discovery of documents. 08
Second, the majority again evidences a lack of knowledge regarding the
negotiation of the Evidence Cbnvention when it states that it would be
most "anomalous for common law contracting Parties to agree to Article
23.' The United Kingdom, a common law country, insisted upon the
insertion of Article 23 in an attempt to limit pre-trial discovery of
101. 107 S. CL at 2552-53.
102. Heck, supra note 15, at 254; see Letter, supra note 93, at 324 (emphasis added); see
also Report of the United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference on
Private International Law (Apr. 1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 785, 808 (1969).
103. Heck, supra note 15, at 254; Letter, supra note 93, at 324; see also Report of the
United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference on Private International
Law (Apr. 1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 785, 808. (1969).
104. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7, art. 23 (emphasis added).
105. 107 S. Ct. at 2552.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7, art. 23.
109. 107 S. Ct. at 2552.
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documents. 110
The negotiating history and the language of the Evidence Conven-
tion evidence the majority's mistaken conclusion that Evidence Conven-
tion procedures are optional. The minority"' conclusion that courts
should generally presume first resort use of Evidence Convention proce-
dures in most cases is superior to the majority opinion, considering the
language and the history of the Evidence Convention.
E. Lack of Adequate Guidelines
The minority opinion is also preferable to the majority case-by-case
analysis, given the lack of guidelines provided by the majority to lower
courts in determining whether to use Evidence Convention procedures or
not. "Experience to date indicates that there is a large risk that the case-
by-case comity analysis now to be permitted by the Court will be per-
formed inadequately and that the somewhat unfamiliar procedures of the
Convention will be invoked infrequently."'1 12
The lack of adequate guidelines by which federal and state courts
may consider use of the Evidence Convention will probably lead to con-
tinued misapplication and misinterpretation of the Evidence Conven-
tion's procedures and will possibly lead to continued nationalistic
applications of American discovery rules.1 3 American courts are gener-
ally unfamiliar with the Evidence Convention rules and would rather use
the Federal Rules and state rules which give them more power. 14 A
pro-forum bias115 is likely to invade the supposedly neutral comity bal-
ancing process proposed by the majority and not surprisingly, courts will
often turn to more familiar local procedures. 6
110. Report of the United States Delegation to the Special Commission on the Operation of
the Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, reprinted in Reports on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (June
12-15, 1978), 17 I.L.M. 1417, 1427 (1978).
111. See 107 S. Ct. at 2557-68 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, J.J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2558.
113. See Sadoff, The Hague Evidence Convention: Problems at Home of Obtaining Foreign
Evidence, 20 INT'L LAW. 659, 661 (1986) (discussing errors in interpretation and jingoistic
applications); see also 107 S. Ct. at 2558.
114. See 107 S. Ct. at 2560; see also Sornarajah, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of United
States Antitrust Laws: Conflict and Compromise, 31 INT'L & CoMP, L.Q. 127, 148-49 (1982).
115. One of the ways that pro-forum bias manifests itself is in United States courts' preoc-
cupation with their own power to issue discovery orders. American courts have often regarded
the Hague Evidence Convention as some kind of threat to their jurisdiction and have rejected
use of the treaty procedures. See 107 S. Ct. at 2560 n.4.
116. Id. at 2560. The accuracy of this prediction is evident in a few lower court and magis-
trate decisions decided after Aerospatiale. See generally Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D.
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The difficulty inherent in balancing American interests with foreign
interests is another reason why the Evidence Convention procedures
should be applied first in most cases. 117 Other reasons are the impor-
tance of judicial cooperation and the avoidance of international cpnfron-
tation, the actions of contracting states to accommodate American
procedures, and the efficiency of Evidence Convention procedures.
F. International Confrontation
The potential non-use and misuse of Evidence Convention proce-
dures will possibly lead to jurisdictional battles with contracting states
and will generally diminish international judicial cooperation."1 " It is ev-
ident from the amici briefs of France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom'1 9 that Evidence Convention pro-
cedures were intended to be minimum procedures to be applied at least
as a first resort, upon which international judicial cooperation was to be
improved. 120
The majority decision in Ae'rospatiale gives little weight to the dan-
ger of international confrontation and the importance of judicial cooper-
ation. The Court fails to recognize the serious confrontational problems
that blocking statutes present and the fact that these statutes were en-
acted to protect foreign nationals from what was perceived to be the ex-
cessive reach of United States long-arm jurisdiction.121 A number of
countries enacted their blocking statutes in the early 1980s when it be-
335 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Rich v. Kis California, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254 (M.D.N.C. 1988); In re
Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386 (D.NJ. 1987).
117. See Prescott & Alley, Effective Evidence-Taking Under the Hague Convention, 22
INT'L LAW. 939, 941-43 (1988). It is unlikely that the United States or foreign governments
will submit briefs whenever a Hague Evidence Convention discovery issue arises as they rarely
receive notice of most discovery disputes, therefore the burden will fall on private litigants who
may not adequately present sovereign interests.
118. See Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. United States, 739 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1984). Although
an intergovernmental channel of assistance was available for obtaining documents through the
Swiss government, the United States prosecutors insisted on using unilateral coercion. When
the Swiss corporation indicated it would comply with the subpoena (the court had imposed a
penalty of S50,000 per day), the Swiss Government confiscated the documents, which it held
until the United States prosecutors requested the documents through the available intergovern-
mental mechanism. Id.
119. See Amici briefs, supra note 80, at 1519-67.
120. Id.
121. See Carreau, A New Reaction Against the Extraterritorial Reach of Foreign Regula-
tions: The French Law of July 16, 1980, in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 349 (H. Smit, N.
Galston & S. Levitsky eds. 1981); Herzog, Current Developments. The 1980 French Law on
Documents and Information, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382, 385 (1981). The British have a similar
law. See Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Inter-
ests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981).
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came clear that American courts were not consistently following Con-
vention procedures. For example, the French blocking statute applies
only when the requesting court does not use Evidence Convention proce-
dures or procedures established by other treaties. 122
As the existence of these foreign blocking statutes indicate, other
contracting states intend to resist the application of the United States
Federal Rules instead of Evidence Convention procedures in the taking
of evidence in their countries. This position, combined with the natural
tendency of American courts in balancing "our" interests versus "theirs"
to favor our interests and our more familiar rules, 123 will likely lead to
more international confrontation.
G. Foreign Efforts to Accomodate American Procedures
Another reason to use the Evidence Convention as a first resort,
which the majority completely ignores in Aerospatiale, 1 4 is the effort on
the part of other contracting states to accommodate American proce-
dures in the interest of international cooperation. The French Nouveau
Code de Procedure Civile now permits examination and cross-examina-
tion of witnesses by parties and their attorneys. 125 It also permits a for-
eign judge to attend the proceedings, and authorizes the preparation of a
verbatim transcript of the questions and answers. 126 None of these pro-
cedures were previously available under French law and these changes
were made primarily in an attempt to accommodate American requests
using the Evidence Convention. 127
The Federal Republic of Germany has made similar changes to their
Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozebordnung).128 American counsel for
the parties and judges may now be present at the execution of a Letter of
Request and counsel may take part in the witness examinations to a lim-
ited extent. 129 Also, it is now possible to have an oath administered to a
witness and to have a verbatim transcript taken.' 30
122. See Carreau, supra note 121; Herzog, supra note 121; Lowe, supra note 121.
123. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
124. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
125. Nouv. C. PR. Civ. arts. 9, 10, 133, 134, 139, 142, 184-86, 222, 738-42, reprinted In 1
NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE (F. de Kerstrat and W. Crawford trans., 1978),
126. Id.
127. See Prescott & Alley, supra note 117, at 942.
128. See Shemanski, supra note 22, at 472-73.
129. Id. at 472.
130. ZIVILPROZEBORDNUNG (ZPO) (Code of Civil Procedure), §§ 393, 160-64 (W. Ger.),
See also RECHTSHILFEORDNUNG IN ZIVILSACHEN (ZRHO) (Code of Judicial Assistance),
§ 86 (W. Ger.).
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H. Efficiency of Evidence Convention Procedures
Not only have several contracting states amended their civil codes to
facilitate the taking of evidence in their countries by American courts
using the Letter of Request, but the use of the Letter of Request has
proven to be quite efficient. 13 1 Refusals to execute Letters of Request are
very infrequent in practice.132 The mandatory compliance provision as
well as the ability to compel a witness to testify constitute a dramatic
improvement over the pre-Evidence Convention state of affairs.I33 Given
the relatively efficient and valuable use of the Letter of Request by a
number of American attorneys in contracting states,1 34 it is definitely a
procedure which should be considered first, when applicable, 135 for the
taking of evidence in a contracting state.
I. Availability of Federal Rules
If difficulty is encountered using Evidence Convention procedures
or if the procedures will put one party at a disadvantage, American
courts have broad powers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) to
equalize the position of the parties. 136 In illustration, if Evidence Con-
vention procedures put one party at a disadvantage, any possible unfair-
ness can be prevented by postponing the disadvantaged party's obligation
to respond until completion of foreign discovery. 137 Finally, if Evidence
Convention procedures do not work, Federal Rules may still be used to
obtain evidence with all the available sanctions under Rule 37. 138
131. Aerospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2565 n.20 (1987) (citing In re Testimony of Constandi Nas-
ser, Trib. admin, de Paris, 6eme chambre, No.51546/6 (Dec. 17, 1985)). The majority decision
offers no support for its statement that Letters of Request "will be unduly time consuming and
expensive." See amici briefs, supra note 80 (discussing the successful and efficient use of the
Hague Evidence Convention).
132. Reports on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Hague Con-
vention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, supra note 110,
§ 5(f), at 1431; see also, Heck, supra note 15, at 237 ("Indeed, in no case reported to date has
another Contracting State invoking either Article 9 or 12 against a Letter of Request issued by
a U.S. court.").
133. See Shemanski, supra note 22, at 474.
134. See generally Platto, Taking Evidence Abroad for Use in Civil Cases in the United
States--A Practical Guide, 16 INT'L LAW. 575 (1982); see also Shemanski, supra note 22.
135. See generally Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 7 (generally applicable in civil
or commercial matters); Platto, supra note 134; Prescott & Alley, supra note 117; (practical
guides to taking evidence abroad using the Hague Evidence Convention).
136. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2567 (1987).
137. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2567.
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Although American law does not require first resort to Hague Evi-
dence Convention procedures, 139 a presumption in favor of the Evidence
Convention is advocated when discovery is sought in civil or commercial
matters in a foreign contracting state. A presumption in favor of the
Evidence Convention would aid in ensuring that courts adequately con-
sider the interests of foreign sovereigns and do not automatically assume
that the Evidence Convention is ineffective. If the party seeking evidence
abroad prefers using the Federal Rules it should bear the burden of per-
suading the court that Evidence Convention procedures should not be
utilized, thereby ensuring that the Evidence Convention and the interests
of all involved will be adequately considered by the court.
140
The Hague Evidence Convention provides an effective and efficient
means of obtaining evidence abroad and promotes international judicial
cooperation. In addition, the Evidence Convention's desirability has
been augmented by the actions of other contracting states to improve the
Evidence Convention's procedural efficiency. It is also important to re-
count the chaotic discovery conditions which existed prior to the Evi-
dence Convention's negotiation, and the great step the Evidence
Convention represents toward international judicial cooperation. De-
spite some lack of foresight shown by the Supreme Court majority, it is
imperative that American lawyers and judges utilize Hague Evidence
Convention procedures whenever possible.
139. 107 S. Ct. at 2542.
140. See Prescott & Alley, supra note 117, at 943-44.
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